

Presidents or Premiers: Determinant Constitutional Choices in 21st-Century Democracies

Lucas Brea

Dr. Diego Esparza (Mentor and Co-Editor)

This study explores what factors influence a country's choice between presidential and parliamentary systems during global modern processes of democratization and their impacts, with a focus on the cases of the Republics of Cyprus and Kosovo. The findings indicate that constitutional choices are influenced by the interaction of democratization movement composition, cultural traits, and historical regime experiences. These insights enhance our understanding of democratic governance and can guide future democratic transitions and constitutional design.

Democratization, presidential, parliamentary, republic, autocratic, constitutionalism, Cyprus, Kosovo, democracy

Francis Fukuyama famously declared 'the end of history' as culminating in the eventual adoption of globally liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1989). While his determinism is akin to a prophecy, the outlook has for decades captured the academic imagination. However, the spread of democracy as a forgone conclusion has not come to pass. According to Freedom House "75 percent of the world's population lived in a country that faced democratic deterioration in 2021." Further, of 195 countries analyzed by Freedom House, 113 are not full democracies – still presenting traits of authoritarianism despite democratic structures. If Fukuyama is ultimately correct and the future is democratic, then we are on the precipice of many democratic transitions to come. The question of how democracy ought to be implemented is of ongoing importance. Historically, countries have either implemented a parliamentary or a presidential system of government as their foundational choice. This paper focuses on understanding the factors that

shape a country's choice of system. Thus, my research question is "What factors influence the implementation of Presidentialism or Parliamentarism in modern democracies?" I conclude that the fragmentation of democratizing social movements, cultural attitudes towards politics, and the relation to voters of pre-democratization regimes heavily influences the outcome of constitutional choice. I base these findings on a qualitative comparison of cases selected on the basis of the logic of most-similar-system design. To elaborate on my argument, I will proceed as follows. I will first review the literature on constitutional choices. I then discuss my research methods and case selection. I follow with analysis of the cases and conclude with a discussion of the findings and potential future research to advance on my findings.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered a new global wave of democratization. Countries previously under the influence of communism started to transition towards democratic regimes and had to face a host of complicated political questions. One of the initial challenges was that of selecting between parliamentary and presidential executive systems. The high complexity and impact of these decisions set forth a lively debate in political science. Which of the two systems would be better for new democracies? Juan Linz' (1990) analysis found that "A careful comparison of Parliamentarism as such with Presidentialism as such leads to the conclusion that, on balance, the former is more conducive to stable democracy than the latter." Arend Lijphart's (1991; 78) analysis had highlighted that parliamentary systems promoted policies that reflected public priorities; had higher voter turnout, higher economic growth, and controlled inflation, while maintaining overtime. Furthermore, Lijphart noted that parliamentary systems, when coupled with proportional representation systems, also helped soothed potential ethnic conflict.

Several scholars have since debated the virtues and vices of each democratic configuration (Haggard & McCubbins, 2001; Lijphart, 1992; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Skach, 2005; B. Wilson & Schramm, 1994; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Persson et al., 1997; Linz, 1990; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Henisz, 2000; Keefer &

Stasavage, 2003; Laffont & Meleu, 2001; Persson et al., 1997; Buchanan, James M., & Tullock, Gordon 1962).

However, only a few have focused on the question of what factors shape a country's decision to embrace either presidential or parliamentary systems. Jose Cheibub (2007) found that countries with military legacies are more likely to adopt presidential systems. This indicates that antecedent regime types might shape constitutional choices. In another strand of research, Wiseman (1990:21) noted that the adoption of Parliamentarism or Presidentialism is linked to colonial legacies (also see Anckar 2004). However, Horowitz (2002) notes that more recent democratization trends have brought a mix of parliamentary and presidential models, defying the colonial argument. Shugart (1997) has noted that a country might choose their constitutional form of government based on regional patterns. Shugart (1997) also notes that slow liberalization of monarchic regimes tends to produce parliamentary systems, whereas rapid revolutionary independence movements or social movements tend to produce presidential systems. Jung and Deering (2015) argue that transitions that pose a high degree of uncertainty in terms of political, social, and economic problems produce parliamentary systems, whereas a lower degree of uncertainty promotes presidential systems. In the next section, I present my arguments that seek to add to this literature.

Transitions to democracy ultimately lead to the choice between different constitutional frameworks. Usually, a long path has been trailed and many dissatisfying events must have taken place for true regime change to occur, as suggested by history. Whether through elite-led movements or popular revolution, the process usually intends to decentralize authority and solidify popular legitimacy. In addition, specific national trauma regarding widespread abuse of governmental power spearheaded this desire for a new representative form of government.

Democratization is only possible thanks to the people driving the change. The socio-economic status, as well as ethnic and ideological composition of the movement sponsoring democratic governance may be of essence in predicting the outcome of the country's choice

between Presidentialism and Parliamentarism. Take, for instance, the case of Chile. After Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratic process through a *coup d'état* in 1973, the country was ruled as a personalistic military dictatorship until the 1990s. Following the 1988 referendum that ended his rule, Pinochet completed the process of democratization by dictating much of the new constitution and the conditions of his departure. Pinochet supervised and participated in a controlled transition to democracy, with the new Chilean regime being built mostly by military, business, and political elites (Olavarria-Gambi 2021). The elitist and homogenous composition of the democratization agents led the country to establish a Presidential system. The support of a likeminded group of wealthy individuals pushing for democracy heavily facilitated the push for a Presidential system. Therefore, Chile's preference for the American model was directly fueled by the will of these elites to limit plural representation and maintain a stronger hold on power.

At times, democratization leaders come from a singular segment of society, forming a homogenous and cohesive group, but at others they can be very diverse in composition and include different ideologies, occupations, ethnicities, socio-economic status, religious beliefs, and a variety of other markers. Further, the distributions of power amongst different groups are the source of this new state's initial legitimacy. The Westminster and the American models differ significantly in the next step: the application of popular legitimacy. My first argument is that, ultimately, the choice between establishing a Parliamentary or a Presidential Republic relies on the cohesiveness of those responsible for structuring the democratization process.

Thus, my first hypothesis involves the plurality and representativeness of the people leading the transition to a new regime. The first variable, fragmentation of political-economic power, is probably the most impactful one. I look to consider how the composition of the elites and leadership of the regime-change movement affect the choice between Westminster and American systems. It seems that democratization movements concentrated in the hands of only one group that is not representative of different parts of society would lean more towards continuing a higher concentration of power. Thus, the country would prefer the American model,

where the President holds more sway in most aspects of governing. The Presidential system enables a smaller group to concentrate more power and to have more control over the state and different branches of government through a single office.

On the other hand, Parliamentary systems would benefit from democratization movements led by a wider number of groups that represent multiple sectors of society via a widely acceptable logic of division. Those, when considered globally, include cultural markers, religious beliefs, and socio-economic status. The Westminster model promotes the dilution of political power to a larger number of identities by placing the most power on the hands of the legislature. For instance, a parliament can elect and remove a Prime Minister (Executive leader) without consulting the public and is usually the only directly elected body, funneling popular legitimacy and thus influence.

H1. If a country has a homogenous democratization movement that leads to the transition, then it is more likely to select a presidential system. If, however, the democratization movement is heterogenous, then it is more likely to select a parliamentary system.

In addition, the predominant cultural perspective on governmental leadership can indicate whether, culturally, the population and the elites would prefer stronger leaders with more centralized power or other prominent leadership characteristics. That was the case of Brazil. After the “lost decade” in the 1980s the Brazilian military regime deteriorated. Leaders of the armed forces could not deal with the economic and social issues they had helped create, deciding to step down and promote a transition to democratic government. The Brazilian military dictatorship established a constitutional assembly, composed mostly of civilians. It decided to hold a referendum in 1993 for the general population to directly choose between systems of government. The referendum presented an interesting case study for political scientists, as the future structure of the new regime depended only on popular choice. That year, the Brazilians chose Presidentialism as their preferred form of government. Even before the decades of military rule, Brazil had a strong history of authoritarianism: since the 16th Century the country had been governed as a colony of the Portuguese, an independent empire, an oligarchy, and a personalistic dictatorship (Nakaguma 2015).

Thus, the Brazilian people reflected general cultural expectations of leadership in their vote for the American model. The centuries of authoritarian presence infiltrated the national subconscious and accustomed Brazilians to a powerful and consolidated leadership. Presidential systems amass significantly more power under the Executive branch, and the cultural perspective on governmental leadership led the population to promote a structure that incentivizes stronger and more decisive leadership figures. Thus, the predominant cultural perspective on governmental leadership may have a significant impact in favoring a higher concentration of power under a Presidential structure or a more diluted distribution of power under its Parliamentary counterpart.

H2: If the country has authoritarian and patriarchal cultural characteristics, then it will prefer presidential systems. However, if the country does not have authoritarian and patriarchal cultural characteristics, it will prefer a parliamentary system.

Third, the public's approval or dissatisfaction towards the pre-democratization regime could also lead the new government to either embrace or neglect facets of the previous system. Singapore offers a concrete example.

Singapore's independence came after many decades of British colonial rule and multiple attempts at increasing self-governance in the country. The British crown colonies were usually under the administration of a governor or president who had widely encompassing powers to rule a given territory, and Singapore was no different. In 1941, shortly after the start of World War II, Japanese forces took control of Singapore and maintained a brutal police state until they gave way to the British after the war. The people of Singapore were mistreated by both regimes, and support for the foreign rulers was low (Ganesan 2008).

The accumulation of authority under the unpopular British and Japanese regimes delegitimized centralization of power in the eyes of most Singaporeans. Independence came in 1965, and Singapore decided to become a democracy. The city-state thus moved towards a Parliamentary system due to their dislike of individual centralization of power, a phenomenon that can be traced back to their British colonial- and Japanese-occupation experiences.

I propose that, if a newly democratized country is replacing an unpopular, highly centralized non-democratic regime, a more spread-out allocation of power might be preferred, favoring a Parliamentary system. On the other hand, if the previous regime allowed for transitions of power or overall less-centralized authority while maintaining significant support, the new regime might favor the perpetuation of decentralized power-sharing under Parliamentaryism. By contrast, countries that are looking to replace an unpopular decentralized regime may benefit from a more direct and concentrated relationship with the executive branch, thus making a Presidential system better suited for the state.

H3: Depending on a country's degree of satisfaction with the pre-democratization regime, it will decrease, or increase the centralization of power in the new republican regime.

After consulting the methodology literature, I began to create a logic-of-case selection using two important pieces of work. First, following Van Evra (1997), I narrowed the scope of cases based on the following criteria: (1) they are data-rich cases; (2) they have extreme values on independent variables and dependent variables; (3) they are cases about which competing theories make opposite predictions; (4) they are cases that resemble current situations for policy concern; and (5) they are well matched for controlled cross-case comparisons. Second, building on Van Evera's last point of controlled comparison, I look towards Przeworski and Teune's (1970) most similar and most different systems-design to select and analyze cases to provide inferential leverage and control in comparison, while making sure those also fulfill the other requirements.

According to Seawright and Gerring (2008) "The most-similar method . . . employs a minimum of two cases. In its purest form, the chosen pair of cases is similar on all the measured independent variables except the dependent variable of interest." In terms of the literature, it is important to select a case that has similar prior regimes, geographic location, cultural political history, degree of state insecurity, and territorial size. The diagram below shows the logic of comparison where

X1 is Administration Level, X2 is work model type, AH are alternative hypotheses, and Y is level of malfeasance.

Table 1. Most Similar Systems Design

Most-Similar	X ¹	X ²	AH	Y
Case 1	+	+	+	-
Case 2	-	-	+	+

However, as King, Keohane and Verba note “we can learn nothing about a causal effect from a study which selects observations so that the dependent variable does not vary” (KKV 1994, 147). As KKV (1994, 45) notes “One of the often-overlooked advantages of the in-depth case-study method is that the development of good causal hypotheses is complementary to good description.” The collection of the data follows George and Bennett’s (2005) method of structured and focused comparison, which requires that the same set of questions be asked and answered for each of the cases systematically.

The comparative study between the Westminster and the American system of Republicanism requires great care in isolating unrelated events and outliers. For the highest efficiency and accuracy possible, I will use the guidelines of a Most Similar Systems (MSS) design. The MSS design will be applied to a duo of states that are highly alike in most aspects, with the only major difference being a divergence on the choice of how to structure their forms of republican government.

After carefully searching for similar research on the choice between republican models, there do not seem to be significant studies on the matter. Much has been written about the

Westminster and the American systems individually, as well as specific comparisons and contrasting characteristics of each model. These forms of governance are well explored theoretically and there are multiple actual applications in modern states that allow for political scientists to study singular cases as well as produce overall comparisons of distinct countries.

The main reason behind the lack of valid research on the topic is the difficulty in locating sufficiently similar case studies. To reach accurate conclusions, the research model must analyze countries that share multiple historical and political features and, ideally, only diverge based on their choice between Presidentialism and Parliamentarism. Although many countries share the basic structures for their political systems, the particularities of each system varies significantly from state to state, already producing a significant impediment to researchers.

Still, identifying and analyzing the causes behind a country's push towards Presidentialism and Parliamentarism is of great importance. Possible conclusions derived from studies on the topic could significantly improve the conditions for the viability of democracy in different countries. At the same time, the findings could help improve the lives of billions of people by serving as basis for more efficient and representative governments across the globe, as well as a model for supra-national and international republican organizations.

Still, we need to acknowledge that no two countries are the same. States are complex and unique in more ways than this research can cover and contextualize, thus we need to allow for small variations in the requirements analyzed. Geographic location, cultural-political history, degree of state insecurity, and territorial size are to be considered as control variables on this study. In parallel, the differences pertinent to the defining traits of states and the complexity and diversity of human cultures do not allow for numerous duos that could serve as a source for practical studies. Our best chance at conducting a valid and useful research that follows the level of requisite accuracy resides in our analyzing the cases of Kosovo and Cyprus.

My case selection for this analysis holds constant the following traits of a State: prior non-democratic regime, geographic location, cultural political history, degree of State insecurity (foreign threats to the country), and territorial size. In isolating these five control variables I look to build a better foundation for our conclusions on the choice between republican systems of government. After careful research and analysis of literature on Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, I have concluded that Kosovo and Cyprus are the best-case studies available for our analysis in the 20th and 21st Centuries. The table below showcases the relationship between the control variables of this research and the cases of Kosovo and Cyprus.

Table 2. Controlled Comparison of Kosovo and Cyprus

	Kosovo	Cyprus
Prior Regime	Military Authoritarian / Competitive Authoritarian	Military Authoritarian
Geographic Location	Mediterranean / Easter Europe	Mediterranean / Easter Europe
Cultural Political History	Colony of Yugoslavia/Serbia	Colony of England
Degree of State Insecurity	High, Serbian Military threats	High, Turkish and Greek Military threats
Territorial Size	4,203 mi ²	3,572 mi ²
H1: Democratization Movement Composition	Heterogenous	Homogenous
H2: Cultural Characteristics	Weaker Traits of Authoritarianism and Patriarchy	Stronger Traits of Authoritarianism and Patriarchy
H3: Relation to Pre-Democratization Regime	Strong disapproval, lack of plural representation	Somewhat favorable, prosperous trade ties
Outcome	Parliamentary Republic	Presidential Republic

The Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Cyprus are both European countries that have a cultural-political history with sufficiently similar traits to isolate most non-desired variables. Kosovo spreads over 4,203 mi², with Cyprus at 3,572 mi², fitting into the same size category (CIA 2021). In my analysis, I will explore in more detail the countries' backgrounds and cultures, but a comparison between the Cypriot Presidentialism and Kosovar Parliamentarism should provide significant conclusions on the topic. When it comes to variables, I put forward the choice between Parliamentary and Presidential systems as the dependent variable for this study. In addition, this research will consider three independent variables as functions of the outcome: democratization movement composition, cultural characteristics, and relation to pre-democratization regime.

Following my first proposed hypothesis, an analysis of the composition of the democratization movements in Cyprus and Kosovo can present significant conclusions on the rationale for making different constitutional choices in a new republic.

H1. If a country has a homogenous democratization movement that leads to the transition, then it is more likely to select a presidential system. If, however, the democratization movement is heterogenous, then it is more likely to select a parliamentary system.

The Republic of Cyprus has a long history of elite rule. From the Byzantine domination of the island in the 4th century A.D. until 1960, the nation was under the control of foreign elites. Since the end of World War I, the country transitioned from an Ottoman Empire territory to a British crown colony, to an independent republic. During the beginning of British Imperial rule in the 1910s, the British stood to develop Cyprus into a military base, much as they had done in Egypt and Malta. Instead, the British used Cyprus mostly for its taxable potential rather than for force projection in the Mediterranean (Varnava 2009).

The Cypriot democratization movement initially started as a Pan-Hellenic reform group, aiming to annex Cyprus into the Greek state. The attempts of joining Greece were impeded by internal and external problems, including communal violence and a Turkish invasion of the

northern region of the island, still under Turkish rule today. The Pan Hellenism developed into a Cypriot nationalist movement for independence, supported by a large part of the population, but led by Greek Cypriot elites in the southern part of the island (Loizos 2004). As it grew out of Panhellenist intents, the movement was heavily composed by Greek Cypriots; thus, the democratization movement was homogenous – mostly composed by individuals from the same social tribe. I thus propose that the choice of a Presidential system for the new regime was heavily influenced by the goals of Greek Cypriot elites and their natural search for perpetuating power. I believe the Republic of Cyprus adopted a Presidential Executive system guided by conscious elite bias and the preference for a more powerful and centralized head of government. That way, Greek Cypriot elites can hold more influence over the system through a single office and further exclude other groups, such as Turkish Cypriots.

The Republic of Kosovo has also experienced a colonial history plagued by conflict. Before their independence Kosovars were part of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, a ruthless and oppressive communist government. The Yugoslav government officials conducted multiple purges and restructured society at the expense of thousands of lives. Citizens of Yugoslavia, especially in the region of Serbia where the current state of Kosovo was located, were forced to go hungry, reallocate in terrible conditions, and were often amongst the targeted groups to be sent to the labor camps. To benefit Communist Party officials, the Yugoslav people were stripped of their rights and dignity. Serbia later became an independent state, and the oppression in Kosovo shifted to the hands of the Serbian government (Daalder, O'Hanlon 2000).

Albanians, Serbs, Boskniaks, Turks, Gorani, and Roma are the six largest ethnic groups in the Kosovo region, according to more recent estimates (Statistical Office of Kosovo 2021). With its complex and moderately diverse ethnic composition, the Kosovar struggle for independence had to reconcile various grievances to prevent in-fighting and build a united front for independence that could stand up to the Serbian government (Daalder, O'Hanlon 2000). I propose that the necessity to form a multi-ethnic independence movement strongly influenced

the decision of the future independent Republic of Kosovo to choose a Parliamentary system. To maintain the diverse and diluted balance of power that granted freedom to the people of Kosovo, a less centralized and more representative Parliamentary system seemed like the preferred option. Thus, my hypothesis regarding the composition of the democratization movement and its impacts is well highlighted in the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo and seems to hold true the tests according to the best available data.

The second independent variable can be identified in the political and social national culture. The pre-established expectations on political leadership can have a strong impact on the republican model choice.

H2: If the country has authoritarian and patriarchal cultural characteristics, then it will prefer presidential systems. However, if the country does not have authoritarian and patriarchal cultural characteristics, it will prefer a parliamentary system.

The island of Cyprus underwent a civil war during the first half of the 1960s; that conflict extended until 1974 under Greek military rule of the island. The conflict was fought against Turkish troops coming from the north, with both the Turkish government and the Greek government claiming legitimate control over the island. With Turkish and Greek soldiers fighting over control of the island, women were constantly targeted to break Cypriot morale and attack the cultural values of the nation. As R. Ridd and H. Callaway highlighted in the second chapter of their book *Caught Up in Conflict: Women's Response to Political Strife*, women suffered tremendous violence and trauma despite not going to war. More so, long before the conflict for the partition of the island, Cypriot women historically held a depreciating and dehumanizing role in Cypriot culture. For the old national culture, women were mainly reproductive vessels and tools for political games. The heavy patriarchal aspects of old Cypriot culture cannot be denied. Despite the nation's having developed more liberal cultural expectations for women coming into the 21st Century, the patriarchal legacy of Cyprus is splattered throughout its history (Ridd, Callaway 1986).

The deep gender divisions were still present when the current Republic was established the same year, with Greek Cypriots wishing to hold more control over the affairs of the national government. In Cyprus, the influence of Greek, Turkish, and British cultures on the local customs and practices produced an old Cypriot culture that involves elite power, higher concentration of wealth, and demotion of women in most aspects of life (Ridd, Callaway 1986). Thus, the Cypriot preference for stronger male leaders is clearly a result of the confluence of three strongly patriarchal cultures and the conditions of violent conflict. The consolidated expectation for strong male leadership can be identified in the elected presidents of the Republic of Cyprus since its independence in the 1960s, all upper-class Greek Cypriot men. I thus credit evidence strongly suggesting that strong traces of patriarchy within old Cypriot culture resonated with elites who sought to couple their natural search for power with the need to exclude other groups from the government, such as women and Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, the highly patriarchal culture present amongst Greek Cypriot elites skewed the republican decision toward a Presidential system having more concentrated authority and volatility to maintain the desired balance of power.

Analysis of my second hypothesis, as pertains to Kosovo, requires recognition of the main trait distinguishing Kosovar political culture from its Cypriot counterpart. Cypriot political culture developed mostly from the clash of panhellenism, British colonialism, and Turkish influence prior to independence. The three cultures have strong patriarchal and authoritarian (monarchical) traits, which passed on to Cypriot political culture and may have aided the choice for the American model (Ridd, Callaway 1986). In Kosovo, the diverse ethnic composition of the Kosovo region led the leaders of the resistance movement to include as many different groups as possible to succeed in the struggle for self-determination and autonomy.

When created, the new Kosovar state was composed of a heterogenous population that was tasked with clashing and possibly compromising their values in the road to build a new national identity and political culture (Demjaha 2017).

Due to the necessity of including different sectors of society to strengthen the independence movement, the newly formed Kosovar political culture did not fully inherit the strong authoritarian or patriarchal traits of either the Yugoslav or Serb colonial periods. The very nature of Kosovar identity had always been intertwined with a culture of resistance to the colonial rule and values. Both authoritarian and patriarchal traits can still be found in certain aspects of the overall culture, but to a significantly smaller extent than necessary to heavily impact the constitutional choice of republican systems of representation. Therefore, I propose that lighter influence of authoritarianism or patriarchy in Kosovar political culture directed the new country to the path of Parliamentarism. Without an overwhelming cultural pressure towards having more centralized leadership, Kosovo chose to benefit deliberation and a more diluted representation system that aligned with the new national culture. Thus, the second hypothesis on the influence of political cultural characteristics appears to be sustained by the historical and demographical data on Kosovo and Cyprus.

H3: Depending on a country's degree of satisfaction with the pre-democratization regime, it will decrease, or increase the centralization of power in the new republican regime.

Although the British Empire did not develop Cyprus the way it may have initially desired, the country took advantage of their place in the biggest naval empire in history to build strong commercial ties (Panayiotopoulos 2008). Over time, the Cypriot access to international maritime routes through the British crown allowed for the national economy to develop abundant tourism, commerce, and service sectors, as well as become a sought-after location for companies of these sectors to establish global or regional headquarters (Bank of Cyprus 2010).

The increased access to the international markets allowed Cyprus to develop economically while still under centralized colonial rule, with a significant part of the population experiencing favorable economic improvements under the monarchic regime. Cypriot elites seemed satisfied with the economic aspect of their pre-democratization regime, and I believe that this increased degree of satisfaction led most Cypriots to see stronger political centralization as a

beneficial path to prosperity. Thus, when the time of building a Republic came, the Greek Cypriot led movement built a Presidential republic based on their affinity with the previous regime's centralization. Looking to maintain centralized and decisive elite control of the economy would be easier under a Presidential system, rather than a more diluted Parliamentary system where a wider range of groups could impact economic development.

On both the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo, the countries had significant degree of dissatisfaction with their pre-republican governments. However, the extent of the dissatisfaction and the reasons behind it are essential in determining the relationship between pre-democratization traits and the post-independence democracies. Kosovo was established as an independent republic in 2008, following an end to the provisory United Nations' regime in the region. Before the UN administration was in place, the people of Kosovo were under Communist Party rule within Yugoslavia for forty-five years and were oppressed by Serbia for seven more years after the dissolution of the former state (United Nations 2022). The Communist regime created a lot of problems in Kosovo, especially regarding increased wealth inequality, excessive use of force by security forces, and high concentration of power under the party leadership. For decades, different ethnicities in Kosovo knew nothing but bloodshed from the Yugoslavian government, due to events such as the attack on Likošane and Cirez. Two small villages that lay next to one another, the communities were targeted by security forces raids, and according to reports at least twenty-five civilians were killed in the hours of the slaughter (Human Rights Watch 2022).

Stripped of fundamental civil liberties and constantly having their lives terrorized by the Yugoslav and Serbian governments, the people of Kosovo had overwhelming proof to sustain their dissatisfaction towards the regimes (Booth 2012). These abuses possibly played into the choice of a Parliamentary system for the new Kosovar Republic. After independence was established in 2008, the new Kosovar system developed into a Parliamentary democracy providing equal representation and incentivizing compromise between the different ethnic

groups. I propose that, to maintain a more equal distribution of power amongst the different ethnicities that compose Kosovo, the new nation benefited the Westminster system of republicanism. Therefore, the high and justified dissatisfaction of Kosovars with the pre-democratization Yugoslav-Serbian regimes led to the establishment of an opposing concentration of power. To offset the prior abuses originated from centralized authority under communist and socialist regimes, Kosovo became a Parliamentary Republic with a weaker executive and more focus on deliberation. Thus, my third hypothesis on the degree of dissatisfaction towards the pre-democratization regime and its impacts seems to do well after analyzing the data available for the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Cyprus.

While the multiple paths to forming a government distinguish themselves clearly from each other (such as the opposite nature of democratic and fascist governments) there is still diversity within the range of each regime category. On the topic of democracies, the first bifurcation leads to direct democracies and democratic republics. So far in the history of representative government, only these two systems have been sustained for significant amounts of time and proven effective in structuring a participatory society. As seen in Athens during the 5th and 4th Centuries B.C.E., direct democracies work more efficiently in small population settings with similar levels of education and wealth across the citizenry. In contrast, democratic republics such as pre-Imperial Rome seem to be more fit for large territories that bear diverse populations, usually with unequal access to education and wealth. While direct democracies have been sporadically present throughout history, the spotlight is usually on democratic republics in their modern form (Hankins 2010).

The prevalence of democratic republics today is not by chance. States wish to acquire, at the very least, comfortable access to land and other important resources, and bigger populations

tend to better explore this access and produce more wealth and stronger countries (Livesey 2006). All in all, population growth coupled with uneven political education and wealth, as well as large territories make Democratic Republics more suited for most modern self-governing people, solving issues of logistics and efficiency that come with full popular participation in large scales. Within Republican government, there are two main paths that states can follow to establish democratic governance: the Westminster Parliamentary System and the American Presidential System (Cheibub, Elkins, Ginsburg 2014).

The impact of power fragmentation, cultural perspective on leadership, and the relation to the pre-democratization regime on the republican choice all seem to be valid and confirmable. When it comes to choosing between Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, the differences in the dilution of political power can provide a window into the reasoning behind the final choice. Countries with more established and stronger elites, as well as higher inequalities, may prefer presidential models to perpetuate more concentrated power and to represent the interests of a smaller group of citizens. On the other hand, countries with more equally distributed political power and who wish to include larger swaths of society into the representative process may benefit Parliamentary systems of government.

In addition, a country's cultural perspective on leadership can affect the popular expectation for how the representative government should be modeled. If a people prefer stronger and more homogenous leaders, Presidentialism was probably benefited, even if unconsciously. At the same time, if the cultural perspective on leadership is less centralized or less predatory in nature, a people may have skewed their choice towards a parliamentary republic.

In parallel, the people's relation to the pre-democratization regime is of essence. If the old regime perpetrated significant abuses and policies that hurt most of the public, the backlash will probably be reflected in the basis for the new system of government. The new model most

probably would take into consideration the mistakes and transgressions of the previous regime to prevent them from being perpetuated. For instance, if high concentration of power was an issue under the previous regime, a country may prefer the Westminster model. Meanwhile, if the previous regime lacked authority and elite support, the choice may turn towards the American model.

The Parliamentary Republic of Kosovo and the Presidential Republic of Cyprus served as great cases for review and comparative analysis, allowing an isolation of control variables and undesired aspects. Both countries have rich histories, cultures, and political environments, all topics that can and should be studied in more depth in similar research. Kosovo and Cyprus provided valuable insight into the republican choice process and allowed us to conclude that the choice between Presidentialism and Parliamentarism is strongly dependent on recent historical and economic developments as well as long-standing cultural influences. Hopefully, these findings will allow for further consideration into the topic and possibly, in the future, help evaluate whether a case's choice between republican systems followed the best considerations. The findings of this research and other considerations that may be derived from it could be of great assistance in promoting the improvement of existing democratic states, as well as being able to influence the foundations of supra-national frameworks of democratic governance.

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